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OF TRUCKS, TRAINS & SHIPS: RELATIVE
LIABILITY IN MULTIMODAL SHIPPING
Amir H. Khoury1
INTRODUCTION
For many years now, various international agreements and na-
tional laws have provided ways in which to determine the liability for
cargo loss damage and delay. Yet, in a multimodal reality these sys-
tems still lack a clear mechanism for assessing the liability amongst
the various multimodal carriers that are generally involved in the
shipping of cargo, especially in cases where it is not clear where, in the
shipment chain, the damage actually occurred. This paper provides a
simple, yet novel mechanism for resolving such disputes among differ-
ent carriers and cargo handlers in multimodal shipping. This is done
by way of my proposed Relative Distance & Time Index ("RDTI"). My
proposed RDTI system aims to achieve a realistic calculation of liabil-
ity for each participant in the multimodal shipping process. Thus, such
a system would typically reduce the need for these carries to argue and
potentially to initiate legal action against one another over the relative
responsibility for the damage or loss of a container and/or its contents.
I. MULTIMODALISM AND THE LIABILITY QUESTION
A. The Role of Multimodal Shipping
Over the years, commercial trade utilizing the high-seas has
expanded and developed. In today's globalized world and with the ad-
vent of containerization, the movement of goods over great distances
(including the high seas) is now the norm. Thus, multimodalism-the
integration of various means of transportation that carries cargo
across land and sea-has become over the past five decades the stan-
dard procedure in all parts of the world.2 Trucks, trains and ships, as
well as sea-ports, are now integrated together into a collective mul-
timodal system.3 Historically, various factors contributed to mul-
timodalism including the conversion from sail (or wind) power to
steam; the development of metal hull ships; but most substantially the
1 Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, Distinguished Visiting
Professor, School of Law, University of Kansas (for the academic year 2013-2014).
2 See MARC LEVINSON, THE Box: How THE SHIPPING CONTAINER MADE THE WORLD
SMALLER AND THE WORLD ECONOMY BIGGER 1-13 (2006).
3 See ALAN E. BRANCH, ELEMENTS OF SHIPPING 1-5 (Routledge 8th ed. 2007) (pro-
viding a survey of ocean shipping and its role).
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container. Containers-being of standardized large metal boxes that
are stackable-changed the form of shipping on land and on the high
seas. 4 Container ships led to the development of various vessels that
are intended to carry containers such as classic container ships, bar-
rage container carriers, as well as roll-on roll-off ships.5
A parallel development occurred on land as well, where new
facilities, such as container port facilities, and vehicles, such as lorries,
trailers and container carrying became a prevalent form of shipping on
land.6 Also, notable is the development of containers in different sizes
and for specialized purposes. Thus, thanks to this medium of shipping,
all major shipping lanes around the world are containerized and are
now joined together in a massive multimodal network on sea and on
land. Mandelbaum sees this as the "efficient merging of different
transportation modes into a seamless whole."7 Mandelbaum adds that
containerization "significantly reduces the time and labor needed to
load or unload a ship. It is preferred by shippers because it means
faster delivery and by reducing handling, it minimizes breakage and
pilferage."8
This compatibility of the container with various modes of
transport allows for transportation by sea, rails, motor, and even by
air carries. Consequently, this method of shipping reduced time, loss,
damage, and theft in comparison to the traditional break-bulk car-
riage.9 On the legal level, this integration also brought about the ex-
pansive use of multimodal transportation contracts.1 0  Not
surprisingly, multimodalism also reformulated the contractual struc-
ture of shipping wherein the shipper and the ocean carrier now have to
interact and contract with various entities including the railroad haul-
4 Samuel R. Mandelbaum, International Ocean Shipping and Risk Allocation for
Cargo Loss Damage and Delay: A U.S. Approach to COGSA, Hauge-Visby,
Hamburg and the Multimodal Rules, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (1995)
(describing the versatility of containers in that they are "large metal boxes that
can be placed on a tractor-trailer chassis, loaded at the exporter's plant, sealed,
shipped by truck or train to the port, lifted onto a container ship by a dockside
crane and stacked in specially designed slots. The container itself is then loaded at
its destination. This is all accomplished without directly handling the cargo inside
the container.").
5 William J. Coffey, Multimodalism and the American Carrier, 64 TuL. L. REV.
569, 570 (1989).
6 Richard Palmer & Frank DeGiulio, Terminal Operators and Multimodal Car-
riage: History and Prognosis, 64 TUL. L. REV. 281, 284-94 (1989).
7 Mandelbaum, supra note 4, at 4.
8 Mandelbaum, supra note 4, at 4.
9 See Thomas R. Denniston et al., Liabilities of Multimodal Operators and Parties
Other than Carriers and Shippers, 64 TUL. L. REV. 517, 518 (1989).
10 See id.
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ers, independent freight forwarders, terminals, stevedores, and other
sea carriers (collectively, the "Shipping Actors"). 1
The most notable advantage of containerization is that it al-
lows commodities "to be loaded at the point of origin and to be trans-
ported without interim handling until the container arrives at its
ultimate destination."12 But, this advantage entails a disadvantage,
namely that the contents in the container cannot be seen and, as such,
damage thereto cannot always be traced to a specific Shipping Actor. 13
Indeed, with the expansion of multimodal shipping, damage and loss
to goods is also part of reality.14 Given the various Shipping Actors
that are typically involved in the shipping of such goods, it is impor-
tant to determine their respective liability for damage or loss of a ship-
ment; namely, how should one determine the specific liability of each
of the different Shipping Actors with respect to any given freight? In
this research, I propose a simple yet effective and practical mechanism
for resolving this issue.
B. The Legal Liability in the Multimodal Journey
The multimodal shipping journey can be divided into different
stages wherein a specific Shipping Actor is involved. This multimodal
system brings to the forefront a host of questions regarding liability of
each of the Shipping Actors with respect to loss or damage of a given
shipment.15 Among the questions that I consider here are: Who bears
responsibility for loss or damage of the cargo? To whom does the ship-
per turn to for compensation in such a case? Are ocean carriers pro-
tected against loss or damage that occurs in the inland stage of the
shipment (and vice versa)? The integration of all the Shipping Actors
in the containerized shipping process prompts these questions.16
This is a far-cry from the pre-containerization era. Indeed,
before the container revolution, cargo moved from truck or train to
ship and it was then inspected by the carrier, item by item, for dam-
age. Only then did the carrier sign a receipt and issue its own bill of
lading, which included the terms of carriage and limits on its liabil-
11 See id. This has been at the expense of long shore employmeAt which has been
on a rapid decline and in some cases has become a negligible part of the industry.
See Palmer & Degiulio, supra note 6, at 301.
12 Denniston et al., supra note 9, at 518.
13 See id. at 518-19
14 See id.
15 See generally Nadezda Alexandrovna Butakova, Multimodal Bill of Lading: The
Problem of Party Liability (Russian Presidential Acad. of Nat'l Econ. and Pub. Ad-
min. 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2294
399 (discussing the liability in door-to-door multimodalism).
16 See, e.g., Denniston et al., supra note 9, at 518-19.
20151
48 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 14:1
ity.1 7 At that time, the sea, rail, and road carriers existed as "separate
and distinct entities, providing separate and distinct services under
separate and distinct transportation documents, and were governed by
separate and distinct regulatory and liability regimes.""8 For example,
in the United States, while the Federal Maritime Commission regu-
lated the ocean carriers, the Harter Act and the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act ("COGSA") covered damage to the goods on board or around
the ship.19 Besides that, the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC")
regulated the railroad and tracks and applied when cargo became lost
or damaged while in transit on land.2 ° In fact, various national and
international rules now exist which address the liability of the sepa-
rate Shipping Actors in multimodalism.2 1 This section will shed light
on the conventional liability regime that regulates ocean shipping in
the era of multimodal containerization. In doing so, the intent is to
show that these problems, relating to liability, are very real and also
that the existing regulatory framework still lacks an approach that
factors in the differences amongst the various Shipping Actors. The
contention in this paper is that said differences need to be factored in
when considering the scope of liability of each of those Shipping Actors
with respect to a given shipment.
From the outset, it should be pointed out that the issue in this
research is not about the identity of the payer to the shipper for loss or
damage of his shipment; that payment is typically covered by an insur-
ance policy. Nor does the question here relate to the scope of damage
that it determined by the courts with respect to the shipment. Both
questions are beyond the scope of this paper. This article considers the
actual relative scope of liability of each of the Shipping Actors with
17 See Jack G. Knebel & Denise S. Blocker, United States Statutory Regulation of
Multimodalism, 64 TuL. L. REV. 543, 544 (1989).
18 Id.
19 The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA') is a US law that regulates the
relationship (i.e. rights and responsibility) between ship-owners and shipper of
cargo that is shipped across the ocean to and from the U.S. See id. at 554. The
Harter Act is partially covered by COGSA, but some parts still apply prior to load-
ing and after discharging of cargo. See Denniston et al., supra note 9, at 522 (not-
ing that the Harter Act is still important despite its overlap by the broader
COGSA).
20 See Knebel, supra note 14, at 544.
21 See generally United Nations Conference on a Convention on International
Transport of Goods, Sept. 1, 1980-Aug. 31, 1981, U.N. Dec. TD/MT/CONF/17
(1981) (attempting to resolve several fundamental legal uncertainties in the area
of liability); Mahin Faghfouri, International Regulation of Liability for Multimodal
Transport, 5 WMU J. MAR. AFF. 95 (2006) (providing a comprehensive review of
the various treaties and agreements pertaining to liability in multimodal
shipping).
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respect to a specific container shipment. In order to explain this better,
consider, if you will, a case involving a claim of reimbursement (by an
insurance company that has already paid the damages to the shipper).
The reimbursement claim is typically directed to all the Shipping Ac-
tors that were involved in the specific shipment. This research intends
to provide a formula for calculating said liability. This same challenge
as to the determination of the scope of liability is also relevant in cases
where the shipment is not ensured by the shipper. In both cases, the
question of the liability that rests on each Shipping Actor is of para-
mount importance. Indeed, such a determination is crucial when seek-
ing to resolve the dispute amongst them. However, before this article
gets to the liability issue per-se, I should like to shed light on the com-
plex nature of the multimodal shipment as seen through the legalistic
tort prism. Understanding the dynamics of multimodalism will set the
stage for the proposed solution.
As already mentioned, the container revolution led to the inte-
gration of sea and land carriage. Shipping Actors now offer door-to-
door service under a single bill of lading. Notwithstanding this impres-
sive development, and as is apparent from the segregated approach to
the liability issue the legal regime has not been able to keep up with
these changes. Thus, the difference between the realities on the
ground and the tort-related regulative framework pertaining thereto
creates a gap. In this regard, Palmer and Degiulio observe that:
From a legal standpoint, the development of multimodal-
ism is significant because the laws governing the rights
and liabilities of carriers and shippers were developed
separately for each mode of transportation during the de-
cades when those transportation segments were viewed
as distinct. The technological advances associated with
multimodalism have outpaced changes in the law, often
resulting in the application of different and regulatory
regimes to a single cargo movement.2 2
Faghfouri adds that: "The application of a variety of national
laws and international unimodal conventions to different portions of
the multimodal carriage resulted in uncertainty as to the laws gov-
erning international door-to-door transportation of goods." 23 This real-
ity is essentially the catalyst for finding a common system where the
respective liabilities of Shipping Actors can be factored in together.
Thus, this article does not intend to provide an analysis of the different
systems thai deal with carriers' liability, but rather to propose a model
22 Palmer et al, supra note 6, 284-85.
23 Mahin Faghfouri, supra note 21, 95. (adding that "[t[he international unimodal
conventions which applied to different parts of multimodal transport were inade-
quate to resolve the complex issues arising under multimodal transport.").
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whereby it is possible to bridge these difference (amongst Shipping Ac-
tors) thus rendering them more compatible and ultimately paving the
way for a more overall unified and harmonized legal system.
It is worth noting that an integrated liability system is not new
to ocean shipping.2 4 Indeed, originally during the Middle Ages, the
ship owner, the cargo owner, and even the master of the vessel shared
equally in the risks and the rewards of the journey.2 5 It was reminis-
cent of a "joint venture."2 6 Over time, this joint venture split apart.2 7
The split led to the creation of a host of laws and treaties wherein ship-
owners were given additional protections against potential claims by
the shipper.2" Furthermore, additional separation was seen amongst
the parties that were involved in the shipment, namely, the vessel's
owner; terminal operators; stevedores; and inland carries, such as
trucks and trains.2 9
The Harter Act of 1893 effectively became the first sign of the
great split between the shipper and the carrier of cargo.30 For the first
time, a U.S. statute was enacted to specifically regulate the bills of
lading.31 According to Michael F. Sturley, the Act was essentially "a
compromise between the conflicting interests of carriers and ship-
pers."32 This Act exempted the ship owner from liability for "errors in
navigation and management of the vessel, but on condition that the
ship owner had furnished a sea worthy vessel. 3 3 Congress based this
exemption on the rationale that the ship owner has no control over his
ship after it has left the port. This is indicative of the trend to separate
those involved in the shipping process; each in accordance with his
segments and apparent responsibilities. 34 The Harter Act's principles
24 See Coffery, supra note 5, at 569, 581.
25 Id.
26 Joseph C. Sweeney, UNCITRAL and the Hanburg Rules - The Allocation Prob-
lem in Maritime Transport of Goods, 22 J. MAR. L. & COM. 511, 512 (1991).
27 Coffery, supra note 5, at 581.
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 Bills of Lading, etc., 27 Stat. 445 (1893).
31 Coffey, supra note 5, at 581.
32 Michael F. Sturley, Benadict of Admiralty §12 (7th ed. 2014). Michael F.
Sturley, Basic Cargo Damage Laws: Historic background, 2a 2-5 (1995).
33 Coffey, supra note 5, at 581.
34 In order to cover all those involved in the shipping process (the Shipping Ac-
tors), it has been possible to invoke a Himalaya type clause. This is typically a
provision for the benefit of third parties that are not a direct party to the contract.
In the case of ocean shipping the benefit is generally in the form of an exemption
from liability. It is generally an exclusion clause in a bill of lading and usually is
intended to protect stevedores. This clause takes its name from English case Adler
v Dickson (The Himalaya) [1954] 2 Lloyd's Rep 267, [1955] 1 QB 158, wherein the
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led to the Brussels Conference and the 1924 International Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading (com-
monly referred to as the "Hague Rules").35 The United States ratified
these rules in 1937 and were substantially enacted in the Carriage of
Goods by the Sea Act ("COGSA"). 36 Following that adoption by the
U.S., many European shipping nations went on to adopt the Hague
Rules by 1939.3 1 It is worth noting that, while COGSA linked the de-
fenses of the carrier with his obligations, it failed to apply a unified
model of liability towards all market actors including the inland carri-
ers. COGSA, as its name suggests, remained limited to sea carriers
only.38 Clearly, different regimes have been applied relating to the
ship or truck owners duty. Whereas COGSA applies tackle to tackle
(i.e. from loading till discharge), the Harter Act still applies to ship-
ments in interstate commerce. Furthermore, whereas COGSA requires
a causal connection between unseaworthiness and damage to cargo,
the Harter Act, as interpreted by the 1933 Isis ruling,39 does not re-
quire a causal connection between the failure to exercise due diligence
and the loss of cargo. It is worth noting that The Hague rules have
been amended over time; a process that started in 1956. This process
culminated in the 1968 in the Visby Amendment to the Hague Rules.40
The United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea com-
claimant a passenger on the S.S. Himalaya sustained a bodily injury when board-
ing the ship (a fallen gangway).
35 Coffey, supra note 5, at 581.
36 Id.
37 See Mandelbaum, supra note 4, at 13.
38 Sections 1303 and 1304 of COGSA are interlocked thereby creating a symbiotic
interaction between the obligations of the carrier (e.g. seaworthiness, proper care,
loading, stowage and discharge of goods) and the defenses of the carrier (e.g. due
diligence, wastage, omissions or acts of the shipper, fire, act of public enemies,
strikes, acts of God, acts of war, and perils of the sea). 46 USC
39 See, e.g., May v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt Aktiengesellschaft, 290
U.S. 333, 350 (1933) (discussing the Isis ruling).
40 See generally Michael F. Sturley, Uniformity in the Law Governing the Carriage
of Goods by Sea, 26 J. MAR. L. & COM. 553, 560-61. Additionally, the Hague rules
of 1924 are officially known as the "International Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading" (of 1924). In 1968, the Hague
rules were entered through the Visby Amendments ("Protocol to Amend the Inter-
national Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of
Lading") in 1968. These regulations are now known as the Hague-Visby Rules. Id.
at 554. The basic premise underlying these rules is that the ocean carrier enjoys
greater bargaining power than ocean shipper/cargo owner and as such this inher-
ent bias needs to be off-set in order to protect the latter against the ocean carrier.
This was achieved by imposing minimum obligations (liability) upon the ocean car-
rier. Id. at 572-73.
2015]
52 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 14:1
monly referred to as the Hamburg Rules of 1978,41 revolutionized the
rules of liability in that they effectively replaced them.4 2 However, the
Hamburg rules did not have a notable impact on the liability regime in
the U.S. given that the U.S. did not adopt the rules and the countries
that did ratify the rules are not themselves major trading partners
with the U.S.43
From the short survey above, the lack of uniformity pertaining
to the liability regime amongst Shipping Actors is evident. Specifically,
there is no uniformity across various topics, including: limits of liabil-
ity, scope of application, definition of carrier, period of carriage respon-
sibility, the standard of liability, damages due to delay, and liability
for deck cargo. Given these incoherencies, much has been written to
address them.4 4 In this context, Mandelbaum suggests creating uni-
form worldwide liability standards using the above mentioned laws
and conventions.4" Indeed, ever since 1975, parties have attempted to
establish uniform principles of liability for multimodal operators.
These included the 1975 International Chamber of Commerce Uniform
Rules for a Combined Transport Document, the 1980 United Nations
Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, and the
1991 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which re-
sulted in the International Chamber of Commerce Rules for Mul-
timodal Transport Documents.4 6 As Rendell observes, all of these
multimodal conventions are "intended principally to deal with the ad-
vent of multimodal door-to-door container shipping practices and to
provide for adequate compensation in cases where damage occurrs but
the transport mode on which it occurred cannot be determined."4" The
relevance of this unification holds true today and will continue to hold
true so long as containers or similar modes of shipping continue to be
used. Coffey observes that the factors that have led to the negotiation
of the multimodal convention "are still applicable today ... [ciargoes
continue to move in containers on a point-to-point basis, passing
41 U.N. Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, opened for signature Mar. 31,
1978, 1695 U.N.T.S. 3.
42 Coffey, supra note 5, at 584.
43 Id. at 583.
44 See supra note 4, at 22; See also Joseph C. Sweeney, Happy Birthday, Harter: A
Reappraisal of the Harter Act on its 100th Anniversary, 24 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1,
42.
45 See Samuel R. Madelbaum, Creating Uniform Worldwide Liability Standards
for Sea Carriage of Goods Under the Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg Conven-
tions, 23 TRANs. L. J. 471, 490.
46 Conference on a Convention on International Transport of Goods, supra note
21.
47 Robert Rendell, Report on Hague Rules Relating to Bills of Lading, 22 INT'L
LAW., 246, 250 (1988).
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through several liability regimes while on their journey from shipper
to consignee."48
In essence, all types of Multimodal Conventions are guided by
three basic aims.49 The first aim is to publish specific rules to govern
the carriage of goods in international multimodal transport, including
equitable provisions relating to liability of multimodal transport oper-
ators. Secondly, these conventions aim to stimulate the development of
multimodal transportation. And last, but not least, these conventions
aim to avoid conflicts with other national and international regimes
that govern the liability and control of multimodal transport
operators. 50
Guided by these principles, the UNCTAD Convention on the
International Multimodal Transport of Goods of 1980 allows for the
creation of a new entity called a Multimodal Transport Operator
("MTO").5 1 A MTO can, by definition, offer to shippers an optional
door-to-door system of liability through a single bill of lading.52 The
convention defines multimodal transport as the carriage of goods by
sea by at least two modes of transportation from one country to an-
other.5 3 The multimodal convention sets rules for bringing claims and
suits by the shipper that are filed against the MTO that could then
bring an action against the carrier.54 The MTO's liabilities are subject
to the provisions of the convention; however, the rights and the respon-
sibilities between the MTO and the other carriers continue to be gov-
erned by existing national or international treaties applicable to the
particular unimodal leg of transportation.55 Therefore, this convention
as well falls short of creating a truly unified liability regime.
It is worth adding that these shortcomings in the conventional
regime are nowhere more evident than the contractual web that exists
for a single shipment. The multimodal shipment is based on a single
bill of lading, known as the through bill of lading.5" However, in order
to fulfill the duties under the bill, an ocean carrier must enter into
contracts with stevedores, terminal operators and inland carriers.
Thus, an ocean carrier is "placed in the center of a contractual web of
48 Coffey, supra note 5, at 574.
49 Id. at 575.
50 See generally Duygu Damar, Breaking the Liability Limits in Multimodal
Transport, 36 TUL. MAR. L.J. 659, 659-83 (2012) (Presenting an analysis of the
implications of the lack of a uniform regime for multimodal shipping).
5' Rendell, supra note 48, at 250.
52 Mandelbaum, supra note 4, at 21.
53 United Nations Conference on a Convention on International Transport of
Goods, Sept. 1, 1980 -Aug. 31, 1981, U.N. Dec. TD/MT/CONF/17 (1981), at 5.54 Mandelbaum, supra note 4, at 21.
55 Mandelbaum, supra note 4, at 21.
56 Coffey, supra note 5, at 587.
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terminals, haulers, railroads, shippers, and . . .independent freight
forwards."5 7 Consequently, this multimodal transportation leads to
complex overlapping legal relationships and multiple participants in
the performance of the through bill of lading. In this state of affairs,
the scope of the parties' obligations depends not only on the provisions
of the bill of lading, but also on the terms of the "subordinate contrac-
tual arrangements for performance of the various phases of the
through transportation and handling.""8 But, in spite of these at-
tempts to resolve the liability incoherence, the reality is that various
segments of shipping in the U.S. and elsewhere abroad remain regu-
lated under different rules, conventions and regulations.5 9 Indeed, the
Hapburn, or Carmak, Act of 1906 that amended the Interstate Com-
merce Act, regulates inland carrier's liability issues in the United
States. Carmak defines the rights and liabilities of shippers and com-
mon carriers for cargo carried in interstate commerce and for cargo
exported to an adjunct foreign country.6 ° On the other hand, inland
rail transportation may be subject to both ICC regulations and the
Carmak amendment.6 1 Notably, Carmark does not apply in foreign
commerce where cargo is shipped under a through bill of lading.6 2
However, interstate movements that are not made under a through
bill of lading, as well as shipments from the United States to an ad-
junct country made under through bills, are subject to the liability
standards of Carmark, even though they may be otherwise exempted
from ICC regulations.6 3 It is also worth noting that in Reider v.
Thompson, the Supreme Court opened up the possibility of applying
the Carmak Amendment to interstate shipments, which is a segment
57 Denniston, supra note 9, at 518.
58 See id. at 519; see also Coffey, supra note 5, at 586, (explaining that in a basic
multimodal contract, "a single party assumes full responsibility for the movements
of the goods from the time of pickup until the time of delivery. A single document,
a single responsible party, and a single regime of the liability are the earmarks of
a multimodal contract." In practice the ocean carrier, issues an international bill of
lading where he protects himself (and his agents) from liability by inserting into
the bill of lading a number of clauses such as: scope of voyage clause (wherein a
vessel can be designated); valuation clause (wherein the value of the package is
deemed to not have exceeded 500$); the Integration Clause (which stipulates that
the bill of lading supersedes any other arrangements); the Claims Clause (wherein
the shipper undertakes to only file a claim for loss or damage against the ocean
carrier); and the clause paramount (which subjects the bill of lading to COGSA)).
59 David Sassoon, Liability for the International carriage of Goods by Sea: Some
Comparisons, 3 J. MAR. L. & COM. 759 (1972).
60 Knebel, supra note 14, at 555 n.81.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 564.
63 Id.
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of a larger international movement.6 4 This has noticeably impacted
the liability issue under the Carmak Amendment, as liability may be
imposed either on the receiving carrier or the delivering carrier for loss
caused by either of them or by an intermediate carrier when goods are
transported under a through bill of lading.6" And, adding more com-
plexity to the picture, liability may also be imposed on numerous land
actors involved in the shipment; namely, primarily stevedores and ter-
minal operators. In the U.S. there is no clear agreement as to the na-
ture of the service that stevedores and terminal operators render.
Indeed, the difficulty in deciding stems from the fact that their ser-
vices are rendered in the "twilight" zone between the ship and the
shore.66
From all of the above, it is possible to conclude that absent a
comprehensive, simple and practical approach to the relative liability
amongst all market actors, the liability regime will remain contingent
on the identity of the Shipping Actor, the contractual setting in which
it operates, and the specific regime and country where the law is being
applied. This defies the very idea behind the Containerization Revolu-
tion; namely, the integration and seamless flow of goods. Therefore, it
is this article's conviction that a fresh approach is required and war-
ranted. I believe that the proposed model which. is described in the
remainder of this article can constitute the basis for such a fresh
approach.
II. A NEW LIABILITY PARADIGM FOR MULTIMODAL SHIPPING
Thus far, this article has highlighted the complexity of liability
related to multimodal shipping that involves truck, trains and ships,
as well as shore-side actors. The article demonstrated the lack of uni-
formity in terms of the applicable liability regimes. I argued against
the dichotomy that exists wherein there is integration and cooperation
amongst Shipping Actors on the ground, but there is much confusion
and a lack of coherence as far as liability amongst them is concerned.
Indeed, the article's argument is that given the number of players in
the field and their direct involvement and cooperation in moving the
containers from shipper all the way to destination, there is a need to
harmonize the liability system. This will help to provide clearer-cut
64 Reider v. Thompson, 339 U.S. 113, 119 (1950) (holding that "[tihe Carmack
Amendment was to relieve shippers of the burden of searching out a particular
negligent carrier from among the often numerous carriers handling an interstate
shipment of goods. To hold otherwise than we do would immunize from the benefi-
cial provisions of the Amendment all shipments originating in a foreign country
65 Id. at 115-16.
66 Denniston et al, supra note 9, at 520.
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answers as to how liability questions should be settled and will reduce
the cost of conflicts and any resulting litigation emanating therefrom.
Clearly, such a call to action is not new. In his review of UNCITRAL
rules pertaining to liability, Faghfouri concludes that "[iin the end, the
fact remains that multimodal transport is in urgent need of a simple
transparent and predictable legal framework which would avoid the
complex and costly investigations in identifying the modal stage where
loss occurs or the applicable liability rules."6 7
The proposed model aims to create a new method for measur-
ing the liability of the different entities that are involved in the ship-
ping process. The proposed system creates a relative system of liability
for creating a liability formula for all Shipping Actors. It takes into
consideration the main factors that affect the way that liability needs
to be split amongst the market actors. This is intended to offset any
inherent biases in the system and to prompt all Shipping Actors and
stake-holders to be more willing to accept such a unified model of lia-
bility. The model is also, by design, comprised of a simple structure.
Indeed, past experience with shipping liability shows that the more
complex the model, the less likely that it will be digested by the system
and adopted by all concerned without reservation. Simplicity and com-
patibility are preconditions not only to containerization, but also to re-
lated questions of liability between the different Shipping Actors.
A. RDTI - Relative Time/Distance Index
The proposed model is based on the RDTI. This index can re-
solve the liability question amongst the Shipping Actors. The inspira-
tion, so to speak, for the RDTI comes from a simple principle in physics
whereby in order to create a balance between two different masses,
they need to be placed at inversely proportional distances from the
point of balance; this is also known as the Law of Lever.6" So too here,
in order to sort out the relative liability of trucks, trains, ships, termi-
nals and stevedores, one would first have to bring these into a single
index that creates a more realistic balance amongst them.
67 Mahin Faghfouri, supra note 21, at 114.
68 The "Law of the, Lever" states that the power into the lever equals the power
out, and the ratio of output to input force is given by the ratio of the distances from
the fulcrum to the points of application of these forces. A lever being a beam con-
nected to ground by a hinge, or pivot, called a fulcrum. The ideal lever does not
dissipate or store energy, which means there is no friction in the hinge or bending
in the beam. Archimedes who stated the correct mathematical principle of levers is
also deemed to have stated: "Give me a place to stand, and I shall move the Earth
with it." See, e.g., The Lever, NYU, http://www.math.nyu.edu/-crorres/Archime
des/Lever/LeverIntro.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
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The starting point for developing this proposed model is to rec-
ognize the differences amongst the various Shipping Actors. The main
difference being that each medium of transport or other party involved
in loading or receiving the container, is involved in a different type of
task. This is evident in what a given Actor does with a container, how
its handles it, and the duration of time or length of distance that the
container is in that Shipping Actor's possession. This article's conten-
tion is that these RDTI parameters need to be factored into the liabil-
ity of each Shipping Actor to determine the extent of his real liability
vis-A-vis other Shipping Actors that are also involved in the shipment.
My prosed RDTI model is explained based on the flowing factors:
a. Each carrier involved in the moving or holding of a contain-
er and its contents is responsible, in relative measure as per
the RDTI, to any damage or loss to the container or to its
contents.
b. The relative responsibly of each carrier is based on the RD-
TI. Which creates a unit of measure that is referred to here
as Liability Miles ("LM")
c. The RDTI is based on a calculation (per shipment) of the
distance traveled or, in the case of the sea ports, the time
that container is held therein.
d. Specifically, each carrier's responsibly is determined by the
distance of shipping divided by its relevant RDTI. For
trucks the RTDI would be 1; For trains the RDTI would 2.5;
and for ships the RDTI would be 5. The reason for this dif-
ferential approach is simply because the 800 miles for a
truck are far greater for the truck than they are for a ship or
a train.6 9 And thus, in order to create a more balanced cal-
culation of relative liability there is a need to apply a Lever
Law type system, which is explained above and as is further
described in this section.
e. Thus, if a truck travels 100 miles to the train depot, and the
train travel 1500 miles to the port and the ship travels
10,000 miles to destination, the LM for each carry would be
100/1 = 100 LM for the truck, 1500/3 for the train = 500 LM,
and 10000/5= 2000 LM for the vessel.
69 For the sake of simplicity consider these different shippers as integrated wheels
in a gear system. In this regard, consider the physical principle of rotation of dif-
ferent wheels in a gear. See Gear, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gear
(last modified Feb. 5, 2015).
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f. Also, given that there are generally at least two ports that
are involved in the holding of the container, their liability
also needs to be factored. Therefore, in the case of sea ports
the measurement is not distance but time and every hour
would be equal in value to 5 miles traveled. Thus, if the
shipment is held in two ports for two days each, then for
each of the ports the share would be 48 hours * 5 = 240
miles for each port or 480 miles for both ports together.
g. Thus the total LM as adjusted by RDTI would be:
100 LM + 500 LM + 2,000 LM + 480 LM = 3,080 LM
h. It follows that the liability of each of the carriers would be in
accordance with the adjusted miles, that is to say: truck's
responsibility would be: 100 LMI3,080 LM (3.2%), train
would be 500/3,080 (16.2%); the ship would be 2000/3,080
(64.9%); and for each port 240/3,080 (7.8%).
The view is that this proposed method of calculation would
create a precise and predetermined relative measure index of liability,
or legal responsibility, between all Shipping Actors. The LM unit that
is a by-product of the RDTI more fairly reflects the share of each
Shipping Actor regarding the damage that occurs to the containerized
shipments.
Granted, while the proposed method might seem arbitrary at
first glance, it is not. While the lion's share of the distance traveled by
the container is reserved for sea faring vessels, trucks and trains on
land need to bare greater responsibility for the goods they carry in
transit and the distances that they travel. While shorter, when
compared to the high seas, their relative part of the journey can be
quite substantial. The same applies, as demonstrated above, to
seaports and stevedores. The proposed system using effectively creates
a unified measure for all Shipping Actors no matter what the nature
and scope of their role is in shipping projects. Indeed, such a system
would create a much more balanced measure of responsibility,
ultimately assigning liability based on the specific carrier and on its
relative role in the shipping of the container. In other words, the
nominal distance and time are not good measures because they are not
capable and also fail to deal with the specifics of each Shipping Actor.
The LM unit is found by introducing a separate RDTI for each
Shipping Actor, and thus reaches a more balanced outcome that
contemplates the differences, thereby circumventing the problem. This
outcome is not only logical, but also creates more distributive justice
amongst the carriers and prompts land carriers to exercise more
caution when shipping the container, given that that their share in the
responsibly is greater than the nominal miles traveled when compared
with the sea vessels.
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It is worth noting that the idea of distributive justice is not new
to tort discourse.7 According to Keating, tort law should be primarily
about distributive justice. In his view, it is a matter of the "fair
apportionment of the burdens and benefits of risky activities" and only
secondarily a matter of corrective justice."71 While Keating's view
pertains to the relationship between tort perpetrator and tort victim, it
can also, in my view, be applied to the interrelationship between
various actors who might be jointly involved in the causing of damage.
The distributive justice that is referred to in this research with respect
to all Shipping Actors is intended to recalibrate the balance between
the various Actors in the multimodal process. Thus, RDTI would factor
in the differences amongst these Actors, creating a common
denominator so that their liability can truly be calculated (using the
LM unit). The relative distance traveled in the case of the mobile
Shipping Actors and the time holding of cargo in the case of the
stationary actors (port terminals, sea ports and stevedores) can attain
this common denominator. Without this, any allocation of liability is
liable to do injustice for one or more of these Shipping Actors. Thus,
absent a relative liability approach, the conventional regime would
remain counterproductive to boosting self-regulated caution on the
part of these Actors.
Further, the proposed system would sideline and effectively
eliminate any conflict between multimodal carries, bringing clarity
instead of ambiguity. The strength of the proposed model is in its
simplicity and in its consistency. It allows for ex-ante predictability. In
this regard, the litigation costs are drastically cut and conflicts are
effectively preempted. Not less important is the fact that similar cases
around the world will evoke similar judicial rulings, and thus the
likelihood of forum shopping will be reduced.72 This equality amongst
Shipping Actors is key to ensuring a fast-paced and efficient industry
70 Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of
Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV., 193 (2000); see also, Anita Bernstein, Distributive
Justice (And Why Social Scholars Should Care) (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal
Research Papers, Paper No. 189, 2010), Osnat Jacobi & Avi Weiss, A Model of
Fault Allocation in Contract Law-Moving From Dividing Liability to Dividing
Costs (Jan. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Bar-Ilan Unversity),
available at http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/ec/wp/2010-02.pdf (2010); Robert Cooter &
Ariel Porat, Total Liability for Excessive Harm, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 63 (2007),
available at http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/1997, Richard W. Wright,
The Principles of Justice, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1859 (2000).
71 Keating, supra note 50, at 194.
72 See generally Jonathan M. Gutoff, An Examination and Consideration of
Jurisdiction and Forum Selection in International Maritime Law: Essays in Honor
of Robert Force, 38 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 583 (2007).
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where integration through containerization is unimpeded not only on
the physical level, but also on the liability-level as well.7 3
In effect, this model is prompted by the heterogeneity of the
various carriers or parties that are involved in the shipping of a
container. Indeed, without a system that considers these differences, it
would be like trying to solve an equation of different fractions without
creating a lowest common denominator, or in layman's terms, like
adding apples and oranges. It is worth noting that the idea of
heterogeneity in torts is not new. It has already been discussed and
considered with respect to cases involving multiple victims.7 4 In this
regard, Halbersberg argues against the approach whereby liability of
multiple victims should not be determined by comparing aggregate
costs with aggregate benefits. In his view,
[T]his aggregate liability paradigm-adopted by courts,
scholars and the Restatement (Third) of Torts-fails to
account for the natural differences that exist between
tort victims. When victims are heterogeneous with re-
gard to their expected harm or costs of precaution-as
they typically are in real life-basing liability on aggre-
gate amounts may be incorrect, and generate over-deter-
rence in some cases and under-deterrence and dilution of
liability in other. A new paradigm for liability in multi-
ple-victim torts is, therefore, needed.7"
This same logic applies to multiple carriers of a single
container. Given the shortcomings of the current system, a two dimen-
sional approach to torts is wrong, not only in the case of victims as is
alluded to above, but also in cases involving Shipping Actors in the age
of containerization. As alluded to above, the strength of the proposed
model lies in its simplicity; an Occam's Razor type approach.7 6 It is
73 See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for "Trial by Formula", 90 TEX. L. REV. 571,
634 (2012) (noting that the best way to achieve "right to equal treatment before
the law" is by adopting statistical methods).
74 See generally Yoed Halbersberg, Toward a New Paradigm for multiple-Victim
Torts: The Problem of Victims Heterogeneity 1 (Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem - i-
Core Center for Empirical Studies of Decision Making & the Law 2013), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1264464.
75 Id.
76 See Occam's Razor, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s razor
(alteration in original) (last modified Feb. 8, 2015) (noting that this problem-solv-
ing principle was devised by William of Ockham (c. 1287-1347), an English Fran-
ciscan friar and scholastic philosopher and theologian. "The principle states that
among competing hypotheses, the one with the fewest assumptions should be se-
lected. Other, more complicated solutions may ultimately prove correct, but-in
the absence of certainty-the fewer assumptions that are made, the better." Addi-
tionally the article notes that "[i]n his Summa Totius Logicae, i. 12, Ockham cites
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based on a simple fairness argument, whereby the proposed RDTI
model is indeed a mechanism for bringing all of the carriers and hold-
ers of cargo to be held liable in accordance with their true, rather than
nominal, involvement per containerized shipment. Thus, each Actor in
the shipping process would be inclined to maximize caution in a man-
ner that raises the cumulative level of caution over a given shipment.
B. Limitation on the Application of RTDI
The proposed system is contingent on two cumulative precondi-
tions. The first of these is that the loss or damage occurred during
shipping, and second that it is not possible to assign direct blame to
any given Shipping Actor. The first condition is elementary in law,
since no claim can be initiated, nor relative liability allocated for dam-
age or loss that cannot be proven or substantiated. With that being
said, it should not be understood that the proposed model assigns au-
tomatic blame to those involved in the multimodal shipping. Indeed,
this is not the case. The shipper must first prove that the damage oc-
curred while the goods were not in his control and where in transit.
The second condition is less obvious. It states that the system cannot
be applied if it is clear that a specific carrier is in fact responsible for
the loss or damage. In such a case, all the liability would revert to that
specific carrier because assigning any blame to the other carriers
would be unfair. It would also be counterproductive, in that it can re-
duce the incentive for exercising full duty of care. From the reverse can
also be deduced, that is to say that where the damage or loss that oc-
curs can be traced to a specific party that is involved in shipping, then
logic and fairness dictate that liability thereto should be fully assumed
by said Shipping Actor.77
Thus, the proposed system would be applied in all other cases,
where loss or damage has occurred, but cannot be attributed to a spe-
cific Shipping Actor. It is in those cases where the RTDI would kick in
and provide a simple answer as to how the liability needs to be as-
signed amongst the various Shipping Actors.
It goes without saying that in a globalized world of fast moving
trade and shipping, it is imperative to undertake all possible steps to
facilitate the free movement of goods. This assertion encompasses effi-
ciency of shipping; customs barriers; cooperation on security issues,
the principle of economy, Frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora [It is
futile to do with more things that which can be done with fewer]").
77 See generally J. SHAHAR DILLBARY, Apportioning Liability Behind a Veil of Un-
certainty, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1729 (2011) (explaining the nature of liability when
more than one responsible party is involved).
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but also refers to the issue of liability.7" The liability and resulting cost
of litigation naturally make insurance and the entire shipping process
more costly and complex. As such, it is imperative to address this
issue.
CONCLUSION
In the container age, products are being moved quite efficiently
across countries and the high seas. But this efficiency is not prevalent
in the liability domain. This article dealt with one part of the liability
question, that which pertains to the liability of all the Shipping Actors
of a given container.
The conventional regulative system fails to give a comprehen-
sive and efficient solution to the reality of multimodal carries. The pro-
posed modal, which rests on the RDTI, provides a simple and unified
formula by which to calculate the relative liability of all Shipping Ac-
tors with respect to a specific shipment. The proposed index produces a
unified measure that I have referred to here as a LM unit. Using this,
all Shipping Actors are able to calculate and predict, with relative
ease, the expected percentage of their relative liability for the damage
or loss of a specific container. By allowing the parties to anticipate
their relative liability with respect to a given shipment, the scope of
litigation pertaining to questions of liability would be greatly dimin-
ished; thus, reducing legal costs and costs of the shipment at large.
Furthermore, the proposed system is expected to not only reduce costs,
but to attain distributive justice amongst Shipping Actors.
A multimodal system of shipping necessitates a multimodal
system of liability as well. The RTDI does just that. This system can
only apply if two overriding conditions are met: first that the loss or
damage occurred during the shipping; and second that it is not possi-
ble to assign direct blame to any given Shipping Actor.
This system, if adopted, can help resolve disputes among the
various Shipping Actors without the need to engage in costly legal pro-
cedures addressing their respective liability over a container
shipment.
78 See generally Eamonn Butler, Adam Smith - A Primer, THE INST. OF ECON.
AFF., July 2007 (explaining the influence of Adam Smith's idea of a free and open
market without barriers).
